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1. Introduction
In urban China an egalitarianism-oriented housing system was previously used to allocate
free houses to urban residents working in the state sector, which was the predominant
provider of jobs. In the 1990s housing reform gradually abandoned the old system and
established a housing market. Since then housing has become a major topic in urban
China. In 2009 the television drama woju (Dwelling Narrowness) that depicted the
difficulty, and frustration, of buying a home in cities provoked national discussion and
debate on housing affordability confronting Chinese households (Liang, 2010). Rapidly
rising house prices and increasing housing inequality have been reshaping the Chinese
urban landscape and impacting on the subjective wellbeing of the urban population.
There are large economics and psychology literatures on the determinants of subjective
wellbeing (see Dolan et al. 2008 for a review). There are, however, relatively few studies
on the relationship between home ownership and subjective wellbeing (as opposed to the
relationship between home ownership and housing satisfaction, for which there are more
studies – see review in Zumbro, 2014). Findings on the relationship between home
ownership and subjective wellbeing are mixed. Most studies have found that homeowners
have higher subjective wellbeing (see eg. Stillman & Liang, 2010; Ruprah, 2010; Zumbro,
2014). However, Rossi and Weber (1996) only found weak support for the hypothesis
that there is a positive relationship between home ownership and subjective wellbeing,
with many variables insignificant. Meanwhile, other studies have found that once one
controls for demographic differences, there is no evidence that homeowners have higher
subjective wellbeing than non-homeowners (see eg. Bucchianeri, 2009).
There is a growing body of literature on the determinants of subjective wellbeing in
China (see eg. Gao & Smyth, 2011; Knight et al., 2009; Mishra et al., 2014). The existing
research on housing and subjective wellbeing in China is very limited. Based on the 2006
China General Social Survey (CGSS), the only housing-specific study published in
English finds that home ownership and subjective wellbeing are positively correlated (Hu,
2013). There are three further studies in Chinese (Li et al., 2012; Lin et al., 2012; Sun &
Zheng, 2013). Lin et al (2012) also used the 2006 CGSS to examine the effect of home
ownership and house price increases on subjective wellbeing. Their findings were that
homeowners exhibit higher subjective wellbeing than renters, multi-homeowners have
higher subjective wellbeing than single homeowners and that house price rises have a
positive effect on subjective wellbeing of homeowners and a negative effect on the
subjective wellbeing of renters. Li et al (2012) use the 2009 China Urban Economic
Conditions and Psychology Survey to compare the subjective wellbeing of those with full
ownership, on one hand, and partial and minor ownership on the other. Their main
finding is that the subjective wellbeing of those with full ownership is higher than those
with either partial ownership or minor ownership as well as non-homeowners. Sun and
Zheng (2013) use data collected in 2010 to compare the subjective wellbeing of those
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with, and without, home ownership, owners of commodity property (sold in the open
housing market) and housing reform property (sold to occupants at discounted prices).
They found that both property types are positively correlated with subjective wellbeing.
This study contributes to the literature on the relationship between home ownership and
subjective wellbeing in China by presenting a theoretical model linking a gradient of
property rights in housing to subjective wellbeing in China and empirically testing the
predictions of the theoretical model. To do so, we use data collected from over 5000
urban residents in 2011 from all provinces and municipalities in mainland China, except
Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia. We use a more recent dataset than previous studies,
allow for a greater range of ownership forms, consider the source through which
ownership was acquired and not only consider whether homeowners have a home loan,
but also consider the source of the loan. Foreshadowing the main results, first, we find
that home ownership is positively correlated with life satisfaction and that having a home
loan has a negative effect on life satisfaction. Second, we find that full ownership and
partial ownership is positively related with life satisfaction, while minor ownership has a
negative effect on life satisfaction. This result is consistent with the predictions of the
theoretical model in a world in which there is significant risk of adverse future events.
2. Conceptual framework
In this section we present a simple model that captures several stylised facts about home
ownership. Our model focuses on the different ownership forms that exist in China and
how these interact with an individual's subjective wellbeing. In this respect, China not
only has renters and homeowners; it also has different forms of home ownership.
Homeowners can have full, partial or minor ownership and these differ in terms of
security and liquidity. Full ownership is where the owner has a property deed issued by
state authority, which is transferrable in the housing market. Partial ownership is where
the owner does not have a state-issued property deed. Partial property rights are usually
acquired with housing purchased at prices subsidised by governments or enterprises. A
partial property right gives a homeowner the right to use the property or to sell it after a
certain period with restrictions on the treatment of capital gains. This is usually levied in
the form of a land use fee (Chen, 1996). Minor homeownership (xiao chanquan) refers to
housing with limited property rights, built on collectively owned rural land and sold to
buyers outside the collective ownership. Theoretically, this form of ownership is not
officially recognized and thus illegal in China, although in practice it is a common
phenomena in urban villages and suburban areas (Chen, 2010).
Owning a house potentially provides both personal and social benefits relative to renting.
For example, renting provides less security of tenure for tenants than if the tenants owned
their own home and this may reduce incentives to invest in the local community (see eg.
Hu, 2013; Ruprah 2010). We would expect that these benefits of home ownership would
3

be reflected in an individual's assessment of their subjective wellbeing. However, there
are also arguments suggesting a negative relationship between home ownership and
subjective wellbeing. One important reason could relate to financial capacity. If a
household has a home loan, then this may create potential financial stress. An adverse
event, such as the loss of employment by one member of a household or an accident
requiring expensive health care, may have a greater negative impact on a homeowner
with a loan than on either a homeowner without a loan or a renter. Another important
reason could relate to mobility. Home ownership might reduce one’s flexibility and
mobility, lowering subjective wellbeing. Low-income households, in particular, might be
forced to take out large mortgages to purchase in distressed neighbourhoods on the city
fringes or outer suburbs (‘the mortgage belt’) and be locked into their locale because of
negative equity in their home. This will be particularly problematic if there are declining
jobs in the area and the individual is forced to travel long distances for work. This was a
common phenomenon in many countries in the fallout from the Global Financial Crisis,
contributing to lower subjective wellbeing (Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2011).
If future uncertainty, such as financial uncertainty and uncertainty over other ‘life events’,
impact the relative subjective wellbeing of homeowners and renters, this should also be
reflected in different wellbeing for other types of home ownership in China, such as
partial and minor property rights. To see this, denote the ‘form’ of ownership for an
individual i by
, where
means the individual is renting, while
means that the individual is a home owner. If
then the individual
has ‘full’ ownership, while ‘partial’ and ‘minor’ ownership are represented by
and
respectively. Thus, for homeowners, both security of ownership and liquidity of
ownership (i.e. ease of property sale) are ordered with f both more secure and more liquid
than p, which is more secure and liquid than m.
Homeowners differ not just by the type of ownership but also by whether or not they
have a home loan. We denote the existence of a loan for individual i by the dummy
variable Li where Li = 1 if the individual has a home loan and Li = 0 otherwise.1
An individual’s subjective wellbeing will depend on both their expectations about the
future and the potential risks that they face in the future. To start, assume that all
individuals have the same expectations. Let S denote the set of potential future states of
the world, and divide S into two subsets so
. The set S1 are those states where
there is either no stress on the individual or the level of stress is not sufficient to impinge
on the individual’s housing decision. The set S2 are those states of the world where the
individual faces negative events that do potentially impinge on their home ownership. For
example, S2 will include those situations where the individual faces financial stress. If the
individual is a renter then this stress may force them to move and ‘downgrade’ their
1

Clearly for renters, xi =0 and Li = 0.
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accommodation. If the individual is a homeowner, the stress may force them to sell their
house and move to different accommodation.
Let

be the probability that a state in Sj, j =1,2, arises where
. Let
be the (expected) utility of individual i in the set of states Sj given their
ownership status xi and their loan status Li. We would expect:
.
In other words, an individual or household will have higher utility when not facing
financial or other stress than when they are facing such stress. Further, if an individual is
facing stress, having a housing loan can only exacerbate that stress and lower their
utility.2 In states S1 where there is no relevant stress, we would expect:
.
This reflects the benefits of home ownership relative to renting in these situations and the
benefits of more secure ownership on the individual's subjective wellbeing. Similarly, in
states S2 where stress arises, if the individual does not have a home loan we would expect:
.
This again reflects the benefits of security of property rights and (potentially) liquidity
under different forms of ownership when facing stress. Further, it reflects that, in the
absence of a home loan, a homeowner is likely to face increased security relative to a
renter. Stress may make it difficult for a renter to meet financial obligations (including
rent) that can be met or deferred by a homeowner without a home loan. Thus, a renter has
a greater risk of moving and losing location specific sunk capital in situations of stress
relative to a homeowner who does not have a home loan.
In contrast, in states S2, if the homeowner does have a home loan, we would expect this to
raise the risk of a forced sale of the home. Again, we would expect:
.
This reflects that homeowners with full property rights have greater liquidity to sell their
property relative to homeowners with partial property rights. And partial property rights,
in turn, are more secure and liquid than minor property rights.

2

Having a home loan may or may not lower subjective wellbeing significantly in those situations where the
individual or household does not face stress. Hence we allow for individual subjective wellbeing in states
S1 to be approximately invariant with regards to loan status.
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It is not clear, however, whether a renter (who does not have a home loan) would be
better off than some or all homeowners in this situation. For example, it is possible that
, reflecting that a home owner with minor property rights and
a home loan might gain lower utility than a renter who is relatively more flexible in this
situation.
Given these state-contingent levels of utility, an individual’s current subjective wellbeing
may be represented by the expected utility over future events. Denoting subjective
wellbeing by
, we have:
.
It follows that:





Regardless of whether or not a homeowner has a home loan, we expect subjective
wellbeing to rise the more secure and liquid are the individual’s property rights
over their home. Thus, given their loan status, individuals with full property rights
will have higher subjective wellbeing than individuals with partial property rights,
which, in turn, will be higher than individuals with minor property rights.
Given an individual’s home ownership status, subjective wellbeing will be higher
for an individual without a home loan than an individual with a home loan.
An individual who rents will have lower subjective wellbeing than a homeowner
unless there is a significant risk of an adverse future event. If this risk is
significant, a renter may have higher subjective wellbeing than a homeowner with
a home loan, particularly if the homeowner has minor property rights.

3. Data
The data used in this study was collected in 2011 through the China Household Finance
Survey (CHFS) administrated by Southwestern University of Finance and Economics in
China. The 2011 CHFS employed a stratified three-stage probability proportion to size
(PPS) random sample design. The first stage selected 80 counties (including county-level
cities and districts) from 2,585 counties (primary sampling units, or PSUs) from all
provinces and municipalities in mainland China except Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner
Mongolia. The second stage selected four neighbourhood committees/villages from each
of the selected PSUs at the first stage. The third stage selected 20-50 households
(depending on the level of urbanization and economic development) from each of the
neighbourhood committees/villages chosen at the previous stage. Every stage of sampling
was carried out with the PPS method and weighted by population size.
The 2011 CHFS collected information from 8,438 households from rural and urban
areas. In this study, we used a sample of 5,229 urban respondents who provided
information pertaining to housing, subjective wellbeing and other key variables used in
this study. Subjective wellbeing was measured by responses to the question: Overall, are
6

you satisfied with your life? Responses were measured on a five-point Likert scale
ranging from 1 = very dissatisfied to 5 = very satisfied. The survey contained various
questions relating to home ownership, source of ownership, mortgage status, type of loan,
housing tenure and housing conditions. The CHFS also collected data on the usual
control variables that previous studies suggest are correlated with subjective wellbeing,
such as human capital and political capital which are likely to have significant effects on
the access of urban Chinese to homeownership (Liu & Mao, 2012).
[Tables 1 & 2 here]
Table 1 shows life satisfaction for homeowners and non-homeowners who do not have
any one of the three types of home ownership (full, partial or minor). The mean life
satisfaction of homeowners is consistently higher than non-homeowners. Table 2 presents
descriptive statistics on all variables used in the study. Just under half the sample were
male, 84.93 per cent were married, 29.96 per cent held a rural hukou (household
registration), 19 per cent were members of the Communist Party and 47.26 per cent lived
in the relatively well-developed eastern region. The average years of schooling were
10.34 years and the average monthly income was 1358 RMB.
Overall, 87.74 per cent of the sample owned homes (ie. owned a home outright or with a
mortgage). Just over 70 per cent of the sample owned one property, while 16.17 per cent
owned more than one property. The average number of properties owned was 1.07.
CHFS asked questions distinguishing between full ownership, partial ownership and
minor ownership. About 70 per cent of the sample had full ownership rights, 16.17 per
cent had partial property rights and 7.21 per cent had minor property rights.
The survey contained information on the source of homeownership. The main sources of
homeownership were purchasing (52.71 per cent) and self-built (33.73 per cent). About 5
per cent acquired the property through inheritance and 3 per cent were resettled following
demolition or redevelopment. The constructions of many of the properties in the final
category are of poor quality and are removed from the city centre in which many resettled
residents used to live. Moreover, it is more difficult to resell them in the market because
of their vaguely defined ownership rights. Usually, the property rights in such homes take
the form of partial or minor ownership. Ten per cent of the sample had a home loan. Of
those with a home loan, 92.67 per cent had a commercial bank loan, 1.87 per cent had a
housing provident fund loan and 5.46 per cent had a portfolio loan. 3 Other propertyrelated variables included length of time in the property (mean was 11.8 years); property
size (mean was 99.59 square metres); whether the respondent thought the property in
which he/she lived had appreciated in value (85.35 per cent considered it had) and
whether the respondent expected interest rates and property prices to increase.
3

A portfolio loan is a combination of commercial loans provided to the borrower to make up the shortfall
in case the housing provident fund loan applied for is not sufficient to pay the house price.
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4. The empirical model
We estimate the following empirical function:

where LS is life satisfaction for the ith respondent,; X is a vector of personal and regional
characteristics; H is a vector of housing-related characteristics; and ε is the error term.4
There are different methods to treat subjective wellbeing indicators. In a methodological
paper, Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) suggest that results are not sensitive to the
choice of ordinary least squares (OLS), that treats subjective wellbeing variables as
cardinal, or ordered probit/logit methods that treats them as ordinal. On theoretical
grounds, Ng (1997) advocates treating subjective wellbeing as cardinal. In the main
results we do so and use OLS; however, in the robust checks, presented later in the paper,
we also present results in which we treat subjective wellbeing as being ordinal.
Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) find that the determinants of subjective wellbeing
are sensitive to standardisation for individual fixed effects in datasets, which lack
variables controlling for personality. Standardization tends to reduce the size of positive
coefficients on income because having a personality, which is conducive to higher
subjective wellbeing, is also associated with having a higher income. This finding implies
we should instrument for income and control for personality. In the robust checks below,
we instrument for income. We control for personality by including variables measuring a
range of expectations about the future and attitudes to risk. Previous research suggests
that personality traits are correlated with expectations about the future (see eg. Oettingen
& Mayer, 2002) and risk-taking behavior (see eg. Zuckerman & Kuhlman, 2000).
5. Results
The main results, estimated using OLS with cluster-robust standard error to take into
account within-province correlation, are presented in Table 3. In Column (1) we examine
the relationship between home ownership and subjective wellbeing, controlling for
individual characteristics. The main finding is that the coefficient on the dummy variable
for home ownership is positive and significant and that the life satisfaction of
homeowners is 0.21 points higher than non-homeowners. This result is consistent with
the general predictions of the conceptual model in Section 2, abstracting from the
nuances of alternative forms of property rights.
[Table 3 here]

4

In the results below we control for the region of China (east, central or west) in which the individual lives.
Controlling for the province in which the individual lives, rather than region, does not change the results.
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In Column (2) we examine the relationship between the form of home ownership and
subjective wellbeing, controlling for individual characteristics. The life satisfaction of
those who have full or partial ownership are 0.19 and 0.26 points higher, respectively,
while the life satisfaction of those who have minor ownership is 0.13 points lower than
renters. This result is consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model presented in
Section 2. The negative coefficient on minor ownership is consistent with individuals
responding to the risk of adverse future events and likely reflects the lack of security for
property rights and inalienability and other restrictions imposed on the usage of the
property. Given the insecurity of property rights, developers, as well as homeowners,
tend to invest less in construction quality, property management and public facilities
associated with the development reducing subjective wellbeing (Deng, 2009). Moreover,
given many minor ownership developments occur on rural land in the outer suburbs and
on the urban fringes, the negative coefficient might also be a reflection that owners are
removed from the amenities and attractions of living in the city proper (Hsing, 2010).
That the coefficient on full ownership is smaller than that on partial ownership in Column
(2), most likely reflects that some owners have mortgage loans to repay. This increases
their financial burden. This would be consistent with the predictions of the conceptual
model presented in Section 2. Column (3) examines this issue directly by reporting
results in which full ownership is interacted with having a home loan. The coefficient on
the interaction term is negative, consistent with this view.
In Column (4), in addition to individual characteristics and form of homeownership, we
consider the number of properties one has, property size, primary property tenure, source
of the ownership and whether one has a home loan and the source of the home loan. The
sign and significance on form of home ownership is similar to Columns (2) and (3). The
coefficient on property tenure is negative and significant, while the coefficient on
property size is positive and significant, but the magnitude is small. The number of full
and minor ownership properties is positively related to life satisfaction. Each additional
full ownership property one has, increases life satisfaction 0.12 points, while each
additional minor ownership property one has, increases life satisfaction 0.27 points. This
reflects that full and minor ownership properties are often more popular than partial
ownership properties among investors, thus contributing positively to the life satisfaction
of multi-property owners. The reasons are that full ownership properties are usually
better protected by law, are built in better locales and appreciate faster than the other two
ownership forms, while minor ownership properties are the easiest to rent out because
they are the most affordable among these three types to low income tenants.
In terms of source of ownership, compared with the reference case, purchased property,
those with property acquired through inheritance, self-built or resettlement had lower life
satisfaction. This finding is related to the quality and location of the housing. Inherited
and self-built properties are usually older and more difficult to maintain. Properties
9

acquired through resettlement are often of low quality and located away from the city
centre. We now turn to the type of loan. Consistent with the predictions of the theoretical
model in Section 2, the subjective wellbeing of those with a home loan is 0.49 points
lower than those without a home loan. Of those who do have a home loan, relative to
those with a portfolio loan, those with a housing provident fund loan (0.55 points) and
those with a commercial bank loan (0.50 points) have higher life satisfaction.
This result reflects that applying for a portfolio loan is more complicated and one needs
to pay additional fees and loan protection insurance. Media reports suggest that
mortgagers applying for, and repaying, portfolio loans face a number of difficulties. For
instance, they need to prepare more documents and sign two contracts because they are
dealing with both commercial banks and government agencies. It also takes a longer time
(usually several months to half a year) to get approval compared to the other two types of
loans (which usually take one or two weeks). Some real estate developers do not accept
portfolio loans because the procedure is complicated and it takes them longer to receive
payment from the banks and government agencies. For example, it was reported that in
Beijing only three out of ten real estate developers were willing to accept portfolio loans
(Zhang & Li, 2008). The situation has improved since the Global Financial Crisis, but has
deteriorated in recent years because of the heated housing market. For instance, in
Guangzhou a developer provided a 7 per cent discount to commercial loan mortgagees,
but no discount to portfolio loan mortgagees; and another developer asked purchasers to
pay additional fees, equivalent to 4 per cent of the house price (Ou, 2013). Some
mortgagees have to make higher down payments and monthly repayments in order to
persuade developers to accept portfolio loans (Qiu & Pang, 2013). There are many other
reports of similar complaints in other cities on the difficulties of using portfolio loans.
The final column is the full specification in which, in addition to the variables in Column
(4), we control for the individual’s expectations. The findings for form of ownership,
number of properties, source of ownership, whether one has a home loan and type of
home loan, as well as housing characteristics are largely the same as in the earlier
columns. The results for individual characteristics and expectations variables are largely
as expected and mostly consistent with previous studies (see Dolan et al., 2008).
The one variable that requires comment is income. Income is insignificant, except in the
final column in which the coefficient is negative and weakly significant. The magnitude
of the coefficient, however, is very small. The negative coefficient on income reflects the
fact it is endogenous. When we instrument for income, below, income is either
insignificant or positive. One might be concerned that income is insignificant, even in
some cases after instrumenting. This is a common finding in previous studies of the
determinants of subjective wellbeing in China. For instance, Knight et al. (2009), Mishra
et al. (2009) and Monk-Turner and Turner (2012) get the same result. While it is not an
10

issue we address in this paper, these studies suggest that relative income is more
important than absolute income for subjective wellbeing (see eg. Mishra et al., 2014).
6. Extensions and Robustness Checks
Knight et al. (2009) note that unobserved characteristics, such as personal energy, might
increase income and subjective wellbeing or higher subjective wellbeing might rise
income through higher productivity. Hence, income is endogenous. To address this point,
following Gao and Smyth (2011) and Kingdon and Knight (2007), we instrumented for
income using monthly household consumption expenditure. As Kingdon and Knight
(2007, p.86) put it: “Expenditure seems to be a reasonable instrument for income since it
is unlikely that measurement error in per capita income will be correlated with
measurement error in per capita expenditure”. The results of the two-stage least squares
regression for the full specification with consumption as an instrument are presented in
Table 4. The result of a Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-square endogeneity test rejects the null
hypothesis that income is exogenous. The result of an underidentification test rejects the
null hypothesis that consumption is not correlated with income. The result of a weak
identification test did not reject the null hypothesis that consumption is strongly
correlated with income. In sum, consumption is found to be a valid instrumental variable.
In contrast to the OLS estimates in Column (5) of Table 3, the coefficient on income is
positive and significant. This result is consistent with downward bias in the income
variable in the OLS results, due to measurement error (Knight et al., 2009). The key
results for home ownership remain intact in that those who have full and partial
ownership continue to have higher life satisfaction and those who inherited ownership
continue to have lower life satisfaction, relative to those who purchased properties.
However, whether one has a home loan, the type of home loan one has and the number of
properties one has of various ownership forms become insignificant.
[Table 4 here]
While we have attempted to show that consumption is a valid instrument for income,
doubt may still linger about the exclusion restriction, which cannot be tested directly.
Thus, we check the robustness of our instrumental variable results using the methodology
recently proposed by Lewbel (2012), which is an identification strategy that does not rely
on external instruments, but rather, constructs an internal instrumental variable based on
the presence of heteroscedasticity in the data. The estimation problem is:
′

(1)

′

(2)

Let be subjective wellbeing and be income. denotes the individual’s unobserved
characteristics which affect both his/her subjective wellbeing and income. and are
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idiosyncratic errors. Assume that is a vector of observed exogenous variables; in which
typically Z=X. Lewbel (2012) argues that, if the following hold:

and there is some heteroscedasticity in , one can estimate the set of equations above by
] as the instrument. The
using two stage least squares with an estimate of [
Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity rejected the null of a constant variance in each
case, which is a precondition for the Lewbel (2012) strategy. We report the Lewbel (2012)
estimates in Column (2) of Table 4. The results, in terms of sign and significance are
almost identical to the final column of Table 3. The exception is that income is
insignificant when we employ the Lewbel internal instrumental variable.
Diaz-Serrano (2009) suggests that duration of residence might also be endogenous if
people are more likely to move because they are not satisfied with their housing
arrangements. Diaz-Serrano (2009) addresses this issue by re-estimating the specification
excluding duration of residence. We do likewise for the full specification. The results are
reported in Column (3) of Table 4. The findings are almost identical to those reported in
Column (6) of Table 3. The only exception is that income is insignificant.
Although the vast majority of households own only one property, three sources of
potential wealth effects may be confounding the effect of homeownership on subjective
wellbeing. The first is that wealthy households tend to live closer to city/town centres in
which there are good schools, green spaces, shopping centres or public facilities that
might be important factors affecting subjective wellbeing. The positive effect of
homeownership on subjective wellbeing may be reflecting not only homeownership per
se, but also include local amenities and changes in amenities over time and space. The
second is that homeownership may be simply a proxy for household wealth, such that it is
wealth that has a positive effect on subjective wellbeing. The third is that the housing
reform in 1998, during which state employees purchased their properties at discounted
prices from work units (although only 13 per cent of the households in our sample did so),
resulted in wealth redistribution through which these households might derive higher
subjective wellbeing from (potential) capital gain from housing assets.
To address these potential wealth effects, in Column (4) we control for the distance from
one’s current residence to the nearest city/town centre as well as values of two nonfinancial assets (houses and vehicles) and three financial assets (demand and term
deposits and shares) to examine potential wealth effects on subjective wellbeing. Longer
distance from one’s residence to the city centre has a negative impact on subjective
wellbeing, consistent with recent findings that better commuting improves happiness (Wu,
2014). None of the five asset types has a significant effect, while the coefficient on home
12

ownership types are similar to Column (5) in Table 4. In a further check (not reported
here) we replaced the market value of housing assets with a potential capital gain variable
indicating the difference between the purchase price and current market value of the
housing asset. The potential capital gain variable is insignificant while the variables of
homeownership types remain a significant predictor of subjective wellbeing.
One might be concerned that minor ownership is usually in regions that used to be rural
or suburban. Thus, it could be proxying missing variables, such as the population
composition in the neighbourhood or poor local public services. As a robust check, we reestimate the main model excluding minor ownership. We do not report the results, but the
main finding is that the results are almost identical to those reported in the final column
of Table 3. Hence, the results hold, irrespective if minor ownership is dropped.
Another potential concern might be whether the increase in home owners’ subjective
wellbeing reflects not only home ownership per se, but also rising housing prices in urban
China. To address this, we conducted two robust checks involving interaction effects
between number of properties owned and appreciation of property value. The results
suggested that this is not a major concern. The first check suggests that each additional
property one owns increases life satisfaction by 0.18 points and that if one thinks that
one’s property has appreciated in value, one’s life satisfaction is 0.12 points higher;
however, number of properties interacted with thinking one’s properties have appreciated
in value is insignificant. The second check distinguishes between whether one owns one
property or more than one property interacted with thinking that one’s property/properties
have appreciated in value. The findings confirm that owning one property and owning
more than one property are positively related to life satisfaction. Owning more than one
property increases life satisfaction by approximately double (0.36 points) the amount that
owning one property does (0.19 points). However, when both variables are interacted
with property value appreciation, the coefficients are insignificant.
The last concern is that, besides individual fixed effects, subjective wellbeing may also
be correlated with provincial random effects that are associated with, inter alia,
differential housing policies, which could exert an independent impact on subjective
wellbeing. To address this, we re-examine all columns in Table 3 using a two-level mixed
effects model with individual fixed effects and provincial fixed effects with clustered
standard errors. The results, which are not reported here, show that there is no substantial
change to the individual parameters and that the variation of provincial parameter is
mildly significant but small (0.009). The interclass correlation between individual and
provincial levels is only 1 per cent; thus provincial effects are not a major concern.
The results to this point treat subjective wellbeing as cardinal. The final two columns of
Table 4 treat subjective wellbeing as ordinal. The ordered logit results in Table 4 do not
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instrument for income so they are the ordinal equivalent of Column (5) in Table 3. The
sign and significance of the variables in the ordered logit are almost the same as the OLS
results in Column (5) of Table 3. The exception, again, is that income is insignificant.
The final column of Table 4 presents the ordered logit results in which we instrument for
income using consumption. These results are the ordinal equivalent of the two-stage least
squares results presented in the first column of Table 4. There are more significant
variables than in the two-stage least squares regression and the sign and significance for
the housing variables are similar to the full specification in Table 3. To be specific, full
and partial ownership is positively related to life satisfaction, while minor ownership is
negatively related to life satisfaction. Duration of residence and property size are
significant, but the coefficients are very small. Number of full and minor home
ownership properties is positively correlated with life satisfaction. Home ownership
acquired through inheritance and resettlement has a negative effect on life satisfaction,
relative to purchasing in the market. Those with a home loan have lower life satisfaction.
Of those with a home loan, those with a housing provident fund loan or commercial bank
loan have higher life satisfaction than those with a portfolio loan. As with the two-stage
least squares results, the coefficient on income is positive and significant.
7. Conclusion
There is now a large literature exploring the determinants of subjective wellbeing in
China. There are, however, only a few studies that have focused on the relationship
between home ownership and subjective wellbeing in China. This study has contributed
to further understanding the relationship between home ownership and subjective
wellbeing in China by presenting a theoretical model linking housing property rights to
subjective wellbeing in China and empirically testing the theoretical predictions. We use
a more recent dataset than previous studies, allow for a greater range of ownership forms,
consider the source through which ownership was acquired and not only consider
whether homeowners have a home loan, but also consider the source of the loan.
The main finding is that home ownership is positively correlated with life satisfaction.
Breaking this down further, full ownership and partial ownership is positively related
with life satisfaction, while minor ownership has a negative effect on life satisfaction.
This finding is perfectly consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model if there is
significant risk of adverse future events. Similarly consistent with the predictions of the
theoretical model, having a home loan has a negative effect on life satisfaction, while for
those with a home loan, having a housing provident fund loan or commercial bank loan
results in higher life satisfaction than having a portfolio loan. The source of home
ownership also matters. Relative to those who purchased their homes, those who
inherited their homes, built their homes or received them as part of a resettlement
compensation package generally have lower life satisfaction. The coefficients on length
of residence and property size were mostly very small in magnitude or insignificant.
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The results have important public policy implications. At a base level, the results suggest
that subjective wellbeing can be increased by promoting home ownership. However, this
only tells part of the story. At a deeper level, the results suggest that not all home
ownership forms are alike. Policies to promote full and partial ownership should be
favoured over promoting minor ownership. The results for the source of ownership also
speak to this point. Compared with purchasing in the market, acquiring property through
resettlement schemes lower subjective wellbeing. The problem is that such schemes
typically only provide very limited property rights in relatively poor quality housing,
usually far removed from the city and with limited public amenities. The public policy
implications is that the government can improve subjective wellbeing by laying the
ground rules for stronger property rights in housing developments for resettlements and
encouraging construction in locales closer to the city centre and in areas equipped with
better infrastructure. The results also reveal that full and minor ownership properties are
popular in the (informal) housing market, making multi-property owners of these two
types happier. In fact, it has been a dilemma for the authorities to deal with the increasing
volume of minor ownership properties which are essentially illegal but provide affordable
housing for lower socio-economic status groups such as migrants (Song et al., 2008). Our
results support the suggestion to level up minor ownership with partial ownership by
granting the former legal status. Nonetheless, this relates to the land use policy in China,
and, thus, needs to be addressed in a broader legal and institutional framework.

15

References
Bucchianeri, G. (2009). The American Dream or the American Delusion? The Private
and External Benefits of Homeownership. The Wharton School of Business.
Chen, A. (1996). China's Urban Housing Reform: Price-Rent Ratio and Market
Equilibrium. Urban Studies, 33, 1077-1092.
Chen, R. (2010). Informal Sales of Rural Housing in China: Property, Privatization and
Local
Public
Finance.
Retrieved
June
13,
2013,
from
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/Chen%20New%20Informal%20Sales%20
of%20Rural%20Residential%20Land.pdf.
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. (2013). 2012 China Households Happiness Survey
Report. Beijing: Institute of Population and Labor Economics of the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences.
Deng, F. (2009). Housing of Limited Property Rights: A Paradox Inside and Outside of
Chinese Cities. Housing Studies, 24, 825-841.
Diaz-Serrano, L. (2009). Disentangling the Housing Satisfaction Puzzle: Does
Homeownership Really Matter? Journal of Economic Psychology, 30(5), 745-755.
Dolan, P., Peasgood, T. and White, M. (2008). Do We Really Know What Makes Us
Happy? A Review of the Economic Literature on the Factors Associated with
Subjective Wellbeing. Journal of Economic Psychology, 29, 94-122.
Ferrer-i-Carbonell, A, & Frijters, P. (2004). How Important Is Methodology for the
Estimates of the Determinants of Happiness? The Economic Journal, 114(497),
641-659.
Gao, W. and Smyth, R. (2011). What Keeps China’s Migrant Workers Going?
Expectations and Happiness Among China’s Floating Population. Journal of the
Asia Pacific Economy, 16, 163-182.
Grinstein-Weiss, M, Yeo, Y, Anacker, K, Van Zandt, S, Freeze, E B, & Quercia, R G.
(2011). Homeownership and Neighborhood Satisfaction among Low- and
Moderate-Income Households. Journal of Urban Affairs, 33(3), 247-265.
Hsing, Y-t. (2010). The Great Urban Transformation: Politics of Land and Property in
China. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hu, F. (2013). Homeownership and Subjective Wellbeing in Urban China: Does Owning
a House Make You Happier? Social Indicators Research, 110(3), 1-21.
Kingdon, G. and Knight, J. (2007). Community Comparisons and Subjective Wellbeing
in a Divided Society. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 64, 69-90.
Knight, J., Song, L. and Gunatilaka, R. (2009). Subjective Well-being and its
Determinants in Rural China. China Economic Review, 20, 635-649.
Lewbel, A. (2012). Using Heteroskedasticity to Identify and Estimate Mismeasured and
Endogenous Regressor Models. Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 30,
67-80.
Li, T, Shi, Y, & Chen, B. (2012). Zhufang Yu Xingfu: Xingfu Jingjixue Shijiao Xia De
Zhongguo Chengzhen Jumin Zhufang Wenti (An Empirical Study of Urban
Chinese Homeownership: A Happiness Economics Perspective). Jingji yanjiu
(Economic Research Journal), 2011/9, 69-82.
Liang, S Y. (2010). Property-Driven Urban Change in Post-Socialist Shanghai: Reading
the Television Series Woju. Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 39(4), 3-28.
16

Lin, J, Zhou, S, & Wei, W. (2012). Chengshi Fangjia, Zhufang Chanquan Yu Zhuguan
Xingfugan (Prices of Urban Real Estate, Housing Property and Subjective WellBeing). Caimao jingji (Finance and Trade Economics), 2012/5, 114-120.
Liu, Z, & Mao, X. (2012). Housing Stratification in Urban China: A Study Based on a
Guangzhou Household Questionnaire Survey. Social Sciences in China, 33(4), 527.
Mishra, V, Nielsen, I and Smyth, R (2014). How Does Relative Income and Variations
in Short run Wellbeing Affect Wellbeing in the Long run? Empirical Evidence
from China's Korean Minority. Social Indicators Research, 115(1): 67-91.
Monk-Turner, E. and Turner, C. (2012). Subjective Wellbeing in a Southwestern
Province in China. Journal of Happiness Studies, 13, 357-369.
Ng, Y-K. (1997). A Case for Happiness, Cardinalism and Interpersonal Comparability.
Economic Journal, 107, 1848-1858.
Oettingen, G. and Mayer, D. (2002). The Motivating Factor of Thinking About the Future:
Expectations Versus Fantasies. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83,
1198-1212.
Ou, J. (2013). In Guangzhou developers refused housing provident fund loans. Retrieved
November 25, 2013, from http://house.qq.com/a/20131022/001785.htm.
Qiu, Y. & Pang, L. (2013). Why do Developers still Refuse Provident Fund Loan?
Retrived November 25, 2013, from http://epaper.oeeee.com/G/html/201310/25/content_1957880.htm.
Rossi, P H, & Weber, E. (1996). The Social Benefits of Homeownership: Empirical
Evidence from National Surveys. Housing Policy Debate, 7(1), 1-35.
Ruprah, I. (2010). Does Owning Your Own Home Make You Happier? Impact Evidence
from Latin America. Inter-American Development Bank, Office of Evaluation
and Oversight Working Paper: OVE/WP-02/10, Washington DC.
Song, Y, Zenou, Y, & Ding, C. (2008), Let's Not Throw the Baby Out with the Bath
Water: The Role of Urban Villages in Housing Rural Migrants in China. Urban
Studies, 45(2), 313-330.
Stillman, S, & Liang, Y. (2010). Does Homeownership Improve Personal Wellbeing?
Manuscript, Motu Economic and Public Policy Research.
Sun, W, & Zheng, S. (2013). Zhufang Yu Xingfugan: Cong Zhufang Jiazhi, Chanquan
Leixing He Rushi Shijian Shijiao De Fenxi (Housing and Subjective Wellbeing:
An Analysis Based on Property Value, Type of Ownership and Time of Purchase.
Jingji Wenti Tansuo (Inquiry into Economic Issues), 2010/3, 1-9.
Wu, W. (2014). Does Public Investment Improve Homeowners' Happiness? New
Evidence based on Micro Surveys in Beijing, Urban Studies, 51(1), 75-92.
Wang, H, Cheng, Z, & Smyth, R. (2014). Happiness and Job Satisfaction in Urban China:
A Comparative Study of Two Generations of Migrants and Urban Locals. Urban
Studies 51(10), 2160-2184.
Zhang. X. and Li, W. (2008), Some Developers still Reject Portfolio Loan. Retrieved
November
25,
2013,
from
http://epaper.bjnews.com.cn/html/200801/18/content_145846.htm.
Zuckerman, M. and Kuhlman, M. (2000). Personality and Risk Taking: Common
Biosocial Factors. Journal of Personality, 68, 999-1026.

17

Zumbro, T. (2014). The Relationship Between Homeownership and Life Satisfaction in
Germany. Housing Studies 29(3), 319-338.

18

Table 1: Life Satisfaction by Homeownership

Homeownership (N=4558)
No homeownership (N=640)

Mean

Std.
Dev.

3.75
3.50

0.80
0.89

Very
dissatisfied
(%)
0.72
2.34

Dissatisfied
(%)

Neutral (%)

Satisfied (%)

Very satisfied
(%)

4.21
8.44

30.08
38.13

49.06
39.06

15.93
12.03
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Mean or proportion
Life satisfaction level (very unsatisfied=1, unsatisfied=2, neutral=3, satisfied=4, very satisfied=5)
3.72
Male (%)
49.18
Age (years)
48.15
Schooling (years)
10.34
Married (%)
84.93
Household size
3.23
Rural hukou (%)
29.96
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) member (%)
19.04
Number of social insurance schemes participated
1.61
Monthly income (RMB/month in 2011)
1358.67
Monthly consumption (RMB/monthly in 2010)
606.49
Homeownership (%)
87.74
Distance from nearest city/town centre by individual means of transportation (minutes)
39.26
Market value of housing assets (million RMB)
1.13
Market value of vehicles (million RMB)
0.05
Demand deposit (million RMB)
0.02
Term deposit (million RMB)
0.03
Market value of shares (million RMB)
0.02
Own one property (%)
71.57
Own more than one property (%)
16.17
Own full homeownership property (%)
70.44
Own partial homeownership property (%)
15.37
Own minor homeownership property (%)
7.21
Number of properties owned
1.07
Number of full homeownership properties
0.85
Number of partial homeownership properties
0.11
Number of minor homeownership properties
0.08
Source of homeownership (%)
Purchased
52.71
Inherited/transferred
4.54
Self-built
33.73
Resettled/compensated due to redevelopment/demolition
6.30
Others
2.73
Property tenure (years)
11.80
Property size (m2)
99.59
Property value appreciated (%)
85.35
Has home loan (%)
10.08
Type of home loan (%)
Housing provident fund loan
1.87
Commercial bank loan
92.67
Portfolio loan (combination of housing provident fund and commercial bank loans)
5.46
Local public safety1 (very poor=1, very good=5)
3.44
Risk aversion2 (highest=1, lowest=5)
2.24
Economy expectation3 (very poor=1, very good=5)
3.78
Property price expectation4 (decreases a lot=1, increases a lot=5)
3.79
Commodity price expectation5 (decreases a lot=1, increases a lot=5)
4.14
Interest rate expectation6 (decreases a lot=1, increases a lot=5)
3.75
Region
West
13.50
Central
39.24
East
47.26
Notes:
1. What is your perception of public safety in the locality?
2. Risk aversion: Which type of project would you invest in if you have the money? (1=unwilling to take any
risk; 2=below-average risk and below-average return; 3= average risk and average return; 4= above-average
risk and above-average return; 5=high risk and high return)
3. What is your expectation of China’s economic prospects in the next three to five years?
4. What is your expectation of property prices in the coming year?
5. What is your expectation of commodity prices in the coming year?
6. What is your expectation of interest rates in the coming year?
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Table 3: Determinants of Life Satisfaction (OLS Results)
1
Male (ref: female)
-0.0877***
(-3.34)
Age
-0.0535***
(-10.41)
Age2
0.000563***
(11.40)
Schooling
0.0108**
(2.46)
Married (ref: no)
0.320***
(8.59)
Household size
-0.00485
(-0.47)
Rural hukou (ref: urban)
0.0246
(0.71)
CCP member (ref: no)
0.0935***
(2.76)
No. of social insurance
0.0408***
(3.10)
LnIncome
-0.00266
(-0.53)
Homeownership (ref: no)
0.214***
(5.70)
Own partial homeownership property (ref: no)
Own full homeownership property (ref: no)
Own minor homeownership property (ref: no)
Home loan (ref: no)
Own full homeownership property × Home loan
Property tenure
Property size
No. of partial homeownership properties
No. of full homeownership properties
No. of minor homeownership properties
Source of homeownership (ref: purchased)
Inherited/transferred
Self-built
Resettled/compensated
Others
Type of home loan (ref: portfolio loan)
Housing provident fund loan
Commercial bank loan
Perceive better local public safety
Express lower risk aversion
Expect better economy
Expect higher house price
Expect higher commodity price
Expect higher interest rate
Region
Controlled
Constant
4.264***
(28.63)
N
4127
adj. R2
0.064
t statistics in parentheses
*
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

2
-0.0866***
-0.0529***
0.000560***
0.0109**
0.317***
-0.00340
0.0309
0.0928***
0.0399***
-0.00254
0.260***
0.188***
-0.130*

Controlled
4.257***
4128
0.064

(-3.29)
(-10.30)
(11.31)
(2.47)
(8.50)
(-0.33)
(0.88)
(2.74)
(3.03)
(-0.50)
(4.72)
(5.28)
(-1.85)

(28.54)

3
-0.0820***
-0.0518***
0.000548***
0.00995**
0.325***
-0.000207
0.0337
0.0943***
0.0439***
-0.00287
0.247***
0.200***
-0.116*
-0.176*
-0.214*

Controlled
4.267***
4125
0.0679

(-3.11)
(-10.08)
(11.07)
(2.24)
(8.71)
(-0.97)
(0.97)
(2.78)
(3.32)
(-0.57)
(4.36)
(5.50)
(-1.86)
(1.66)
(-1.64)

(28.59)

4
-0.0931***
-0.0545***
0.000562***
0.00768
0.282***
-0.0186
0.0292
0.0932**
0.0481***
-0.00476

(-3.18)
(-9.40)
(10.19)
(1.54)
(6.59)
(-1.56)
(0.71)
(2.51)
(3.27)
(-0.83)

5
-0.0965***
-0.0478***
0.000498***
0.0112**
0.254***
-0.0118
0.0365
0.0687*
0.0587***
-0.00942*

(-3.41)
(-8.52)
(9.35)
(2.32)
(6.16)
(-1.03)
(0.92)
(1.92)
(4.15)
(-1.72)

0.389***
0.235***
-0.160**
-0.491***

(3.61)
(2.65)
(-2.08)
(-3.24)

0.376***
0.248***
-0.149**
-0.489***

(3.63)
(2.90)
(-2.02)
(-3.37)

-0.00320*
0.000885***
0.0535
0.108***
0.266***

(-1.73)
(3.38)
(1.19)
(3.19)
(2.83)

-0.00408**
0.000784***
0.0569
0.0939***
0.274***

(-2.29)
(3.12)
(1.32)
(2.90)
(3.05)

-0.189***
-0.0695*
-0.139**
-0.0226

(-2.60)
(-1.70)
(-2.52)
(-0.27)

-0.172**
-0.0448
-0.106**
0.00427

(-2.46)
(-1.14)
(-1.99)
(0.05)

0.548***
0.495***

(3.14)
(3.08)

0.546***
0.521***
0.155***
0.0145
0.183***
-0.0235
0.00312
0.0263
Controlled
2.765***
3231
0.146

(3.26)
(3.38)
(10.14)
(1.20)
(11.26)
(-1.47)
(0.17)
(1.30)

Controlled
4.247***
3231
0.072

(24.21)

(12.70)
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Table 4: Robust Checks

Male (ref: female)
Age
Age2
Schooling
Married (ref: no)
Household size
Rural hukou (ref: urban)
Party member (ref: no)
Social insurance
LnIncome
Own partial homeownership property (ref: no)
Own full homeownership property (ref: no)
Own minor homeownership property (ref: no)

Property tenure
Property size
No. of partial homeownership properties
No. of full homeownership properties
No. of minor homeownership properties
Source of homeownership (ref: purchased)
Inherited/transferred
Self-built
Resettled/compensated
Others
Home loan (ref: no)
Type of home loan (ref: portfolio loan)
Housing provident fund loan
Commercial bank loan
Perceive better local public safety
Express lower risk aversion
Expect better economy
Expect higher house price
Expect higher commodity price
Expect higher interest rate
Distance from nearest city/town centre
Market value of housing assets
Market value of vehicles
Demand deposit
Term deposit
Market value of shares
Constant
Constant-cut1
Constant-cut2
Constant-cut3
Constant-cut4
N
IV relevance and validity tests

(1)
TSLS regression
with consumption as IV
-0.753**
(-2.19)
-0.0771***
(-3.91)
0.00150***
(2.85)
0.0385**
(2.12)
0.344***
(3.29)
0.0327
(0.92)
-0.824*
(-1.83)
0.0489
(0.59)
-0.962*
(-1.83)
0.639*
(1.91)
0.605**
(2.25)
0.573**
(2.22)
-0.163
(-0.95)
0.00313
(0.58)
-0.000332
(-0.41)
0.0254
(0.25)
-0.0607
(-0.56)
0.293
(1.40)

(2)
TSLS regression
with (
̅ ̂ as IV
-0.0778**
(-2.30)
-0.0472***
(-8.40)
0.000472***
(8.00)
0.0104**
(2.13)
0.252***
(6.15)
-0.0132
(-1.15)
0.0612
(1.31)
0.0690*
(1.94)
0.0877***
(2.73)
-0.0281
(-1.45)
0.368***
(3.55)
0.236***
(2.76)
-0.149**
(-2.02)
-0.00422**
(-2.37)
0.000819***
(3.24)
0.0577
(1.35)
0.0985***
(3.02)
0.272***
(3.03)

(3)
OLS regression
without property tenure
-0.0965***
(-3.44)
-0.0481***
(-8.69)
0.000495***
(9.41)
0.0118**
(2.47)
0.263***
(6.45)
-0.0121
(-1.07)
0.0343
(0.87)
0.0709**
(2.01)
0.0567***
(4.04)
-0.00875
(-1.61)
0.328***
(3.24)
0.198**
(2.40)
-0.146**
(-2.00)
0.000914***
0.0566
0.0953***
0.242***

(3.72)
(1.32)
(2.97)
(2.73)

(4)
OLS regression with
potential wealth effects
-0.0967***
(-3.40)
-0.0475***
(-8.44)
0.000498***
(9.33)
0.0117**
(2.40)
0.249***
(5.99)
-0.0106
(-0.92)
0.0395
(0.99)
0.0677*
(1.89)
0.0578***
(4.06)
-0.00879
(-1.60)
0.244***
(2.86)
0.373***
(3.60)
-0.134*
(-1.81)
-0.00423**
(-2.37)
0.000827***
(3.26)
0.0507
(1.18)
0.0933***
(2.86)
0.266***
(2.95)

(5)
Ordered logit regression
-0.251***
-0.129***
0.00134***
0.0224*
0.626***
-0.0349
0.0664
0.175*
0.143***
-0.0225
0.995***
0.630***
-0.366*
-0.00902**
0.00220***
0.147
0.267***
0.732***

(-3.44)
(-8.62)
(9.41)
(1.78)
(5.80)
(-1.19)
(0.65)
(1.92)
(3.89)
(-1.59)
(3.54)
(2.83)
(-1.90)
(-1.96)
(3.32)
(1.13)
(3.13)
(3.02)

(6)
Ordered logit regression
with consumption as IV
-0.112***
(-2.94)
-0.0656***
(-8.23)
0.000689***
(8.99)
0.00729
(1.10)
0.318***
(5.63)
-0.00461
(-0.30)
0.0470
(0.89)
0.0784
(1.63)
0.0691***
(3.59)
0.103***
(5.21)
0.473***
(3.41)
0.314***
(2.76)
-0.204**
(-2.07)
-0.00525**
(-2.19)
0.000915***
(2.70)
0.00677
(1.20)
0.105**
(2.38)
0.334***
(2.79)

-0.357*
-0.149
0.175
0.182
-0.160

(-1.83)
(-1.41)
(0.90)
(0.88)
(-0.43)

-0.166**
-0.0419
-0.114**
-0.000766
-0.498***

(-2.38)
(-1.07)
(-2.12)
(-0.01)
(-3.43)

-0.190***
-0.0767**
-0.101*
-0.00499
-0.469***

(-2.79)
(-2.06)
(-1.92)
(-0.06)
(-3.25)

-0.173**
-0.0472
-0.109**
0.00272
-0.487***

(-2.48)
(-1.20)
(-2.05)
(0.03)
(-3.35)

-0.394**
-0.125
-0.259*
0.0551
-1.145***

(-2.15)
(-1.24)
(-1.88)
(0.27)
(-2.93)

-0.170*
-0.0471
-0.143**
-0.000877
-0.606***

(-1.81)
(-0.90)
(2.79)
(-0.01)
(-3.14)

0.121
-0.0269
0.0550
-0.00178
0.143***
-0.0750*
-0.00665
0.0377

(0.27)
(-0.06)
(0.91)
(-0.06)
(3.44)
(-1.68)
(-0.16)
(0.80)

0.558***
0.537***
0.158***
0.0150
0.183***
-0.0223
0.00345
0.0260

(3.33)
(3.47)
(10.20)
(1.25)
(11.34)
(-1.39)
(0.19)
(1.29)

0.537***
0.515***
0.153***
0.0143
0.181***
-0.0234
0.000338
0.0241

(3.23)
(3.36)
(10.09)
(1.20)
(11.28)
(-1.48)
(0.02)
(1.21)

(3.27)
(3.32)
(10.22)
(1.15)
(11.01)
(-1.67)
(0.32)
(1.09)
(-1.85)
(-0.00)
(-1.62)
(-0.00)
(-0.45)
(-0.78)

1.304***
1.238***
0.424***
0.0382
0.490***
-0.0676
0.00951
0.0727

(2.94)
(3.00)
(10.46)
(1.24)
(11.28)
(-1.62)
(0.21)
(1.36)

0.701***
0.657***
0.202***
0.0108
0.246***
-0.0299
-0.00148
0.0260

(3.14)
(3.21)
(9.17)
(0.67)
(10.59)
(-1.39)
(-0.06)
(0.97)

(1.85)

Controlled
2.807***

(12.70)

Controlled
2.800***

(13.00)

0.548***
0.513***
0.156***
0.0138
0.180***
-0.0270*
0.00581
0.0221
-0.000796*
-0.0000349
-0.0998
-0.000224
-0.0583
-0.0637
Controlled
2.800***

Controlled
1.548*

3186

3231

3214

3217

Controlled

Controlled

(12.73)
-2.608***
-0.737
1.790***
4.329***
3231

(-4.39)
(-1.29)
(3.15)
(7.55)

-0.913***
-0.147
1.116***
2.480***
4147
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(-2.97)
(-0.49)
(3.82)
(8.40)

Endogeneity test: Durbin-Wu-Hausman
0.00001
F test (p-value)
Underidentification test: Anderson
0.0316
0.0000
canon. corr. LM statistic (p-value)
Weak identification test: Cragg-Donald
4.578
(16.38)
8.621
(11.29)
Wald F statistic (10% critical value)
t statistics in parentheses for OLS and TSLS regressions; z statistics in parentheses for logit regressions
*
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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